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CUTTING WASTE BY MAKING RULES:
PROMISES, PITFALLS, AND REALISTIC PROSPECTS
JAN BLUSTEIN & THEODORE R. MARMOR-
American medical costs, one hardly needs to say, continue to
rise relentlessly. In 1990, health expenditures consumed approxi-
mately 12.2% of America's GNP.1 A decade earlier, the share was
9.1%.2 In 1970, we spent approximately 7.4%.3 There has devel-
oped an apparent consensus-among government, labor, and
profession leaders-that costs must be contained. At the same time,
there is widespread agreement that access must be universalized. As
a result, many believe that excruciatingly hard choices are unavoid-
able.
This perceived dilemma has led to a great deal of talk about
rationing.4 The tenor of the commentary indicates that it is a
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1 See Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Fall 1991, at 29, 30.
2 See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1990, at 92 (110th ed. 1990).
3 See id.
4 The topic of rationing first drew widespread attention with the publication of
Aaron and Schwartz's pioneering comparative study of the scale and distribution of
therapeutic procedures under Britain's National Health Service and America's health
care system. See HENRY J. AARON AND WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL
PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984). Their argument, that British-style
rationing decisions will inevitably need to be made in this country, has subsequently
been elaborated upon. See William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-
Containment Strategies: Why They Can Parade Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220
(1987). For a critical analysis, see Theodore Marmor & Rudolf Klein, Costs Versus
Care: America's Health Care Dilemma Wrongly Considered, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 19 (1986).
A second wave of popular attention to rationing accompanied Oregon's
controversial and widely noted proposal to alter the list of reimbursable services
under the Medicaid program. For an evenhanded description of that program, under
which reimbursement decisions would be guided by "cost-effectiveness" consider-
ations, see Daniel M. Fox and Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Health Care in Oregon:
The New Accountability, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 7; for an illuminating
discussion of the politics surrounding the plan, see Lawrence D. Brown, The National
Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 28; for an analysis
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fearsome solution to our present troubles-painful and divisive,
entailing choices that no one wants to make but which must be
faced due to inescapable scarcity. 5 Both contemporary rhetoric
and current health policy, however, hold out the hope of a far more
agreeable alternative. Galvanized by the realization that much
medical care is of uncertain value, and bolstered by findings that
show significant variation in medical practice patterns, a coalition
of policymakers, politicians, and researchers is now actively engaged
in seeking to contain costs by eliminating wasteful care. This
appears an attractive course. Waste-cutting, unlike rationing, does
not connote the cruel denial of necessary care. On the contrary, it
suggests saving people from medical interventions that would not
have done them any good. If "rationing" is the fearsome alterna-
tive, "cutting waste" is the benign one.
While consensus grows that wasteful practice is a problem, there
is considerable disagreement about the solution. Such disagreement
is hardly surprising, since cutting waste is merely a goal, not a
program. Cutting waste can mean any of a number of things. It
can mean regionalizing services, instituting yearly expenditure
targets, implementing managed care systems, or developing
elaborate review mechanisms to constrain the diffusion of new
technologies. Indeed, the idea of "cutting waste" is so broad in its
potential scope that it can subsume many hotly debated reforms in
the field of health policy. Like Health Maintenance Organizations,
competition, and Diagnostic Related Groups before it, it is another
vaunted panacea, the new great answer to arrive on the American
health policy agenda.
6
of the ethical issues it raises, see Norman Daniels, Is The Oregon Rationing Plan Fair?,
265JAMA 2232 (1991); and for a particularly critical review of the plan as an effort
to limit services to the poor, see Bruce C. Vladeck, Unhealthy Rations, AM. PROSPECT,
Summer 1991, at 101.
5 See Theodore R. Marmor &Jan Blustein, Introduction to Rationing, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1539 (1992).
6 A reader of the popular press might well conclude that one-quarter to one-half
of present medical practice is "pure waste," benefitting no one. For example,
according to a New York Times op-ed piece of a few years ago:
[T]he evidence is now overwhelming that at least twenty-five percent of the
money that Americans spend on health care is wasted.... There is a
growing consensus that half the coronary bypasses, most Caesarean sections
and a significant proportion of many other procedures... are unnecessary.
A former editor of [AMA] is convinced that more than half of the 40
million medical tests performed each year "do not really contribute to a
patient's diagnosis or therapy."
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Billions Blown on Health, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1989, at A25.
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This essay critically assesses the widely advertised plan to cut
waste by making microallocational rules for the provision of medical
care. Such rules, variously denominated "practice parameters,"
7
"clinical guidelines,"8 and "standards of care,"9 are aimed at
ensuring that no patient is subjected to "wasteful" care by specifying
what treatments particular patients should receive. For example,
the rule that "healthy patients under 40 years of age without a
family history of heart disease should not be given an electrocardio-
gram" is a practice parameter. It could be used by physicians to
guide day-to-day treatment decisions. It could also be used by
payers to control reimbursement, and by policymakers to appraise
aggregate data about medical care utilization.
10
Our analysis raises the fundamental but too-little discussed
question of what constitutes waste. Our central claim is that so-
called "wasteful" practice is a conceptual hodgepodge, which
encompasses treatments that are (1) ineffective; (2) of uncertain
effectiveness; (3) ethically troubling; or (4) not allocationally
efficient." From this starting point, we address issues of rule
making and resource allocation and ask the following questions:
Can all four of these types of wasteful care be identified in ways that
are scientifically defensible and administratively practicable? What
obstacles must be faced to make cutting waste by making rules into
a policy in each case? Are there American institutions and attitudes
that would make such rule making more costly, and therefore less
attractive, than it seems? And can any (or all) of these four types of
7 SeeJames S. Todd M.D.: Only Parameters Will Give MDs Needed Flexibility, AM.
MED. NEWsJan. 6, 1989, at 23,23 [hereinafter, Todd Interview] (interview with AMA
Senior Deputy Executive Vice President).
8 See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM NOTE: CLINICAL GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT (1990)
[hereinafter AHCPR, PROGRAM NOTE].
9 See Mark R. Chassin, Standards of Care in Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 437, 437 (1988).
10 This Article does not address recently developed techniques, such as "physician
profiling," whereby payors examine physicians' patterns of care in order to detect
tendencies toward inappropriate or wasteful use of services. See Robert W. Dubois,
Reducing Unnecessary Care: Different Approaches to the "Big Ticket" and the "Little Ticket"
Items,J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., October 1991, at 30; Milt Freudenheim, Software
Controls on Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at D2. Many of our comments
apply equally well to these newer approaches, however.
1 Those falling into this last category are often said to be "not cost-effective," but
this term is all too often used imprecisely. In the medical literature "cost-effective"
has been variously taken to be synonymous with "cost saving," "effective," and "having
an additional benefit worth the cost." See Peter Doubilet et al., Use and Misuse of the
Term 'Cost-Effective' in Medicine, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 253, 253-54 (1986).
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waste be cut without confronting the dilemma of difficult choices?
But before approaching these questions, we begin by briefly
reviewing the ways in which the problem of wasteful care has been
framed by health care analysts, providers, and policymakers.
I. LOOSE TALK ABOUT "WASTE."
Terms like "wasteful," "ineffective," "inappropriate," "of
unproven effectiveness," "unnecessary," and even "irrational" are
used loosely and often interchangeably in the literature that is
critical of current medical practice. Commentators have lamented
the prevalence of unnecessary elective surgery,12 gratuitous "little
ticket" diagnostic tests,13 and expensive treatments for AIDS
patients. 14 It is tempting to assume that these practices share
some fundamental characteristic that places them within a unified
category of wasteful medical treatments.
Although the temptation is evident, assimilating various
"inappropriate" types of care within the rhetoric of waste cutting is
at best confusing. Take the example of the rules that determine
when physician office visits are "medically necessary." 15 As one
physician explained it:
Medicare has set guidelines that for a given condition, you're only
allowed to see patients so many times. That doesn't mean that you
can't see them more often-you certainly can-but they won't pay
for it....
It takes a great deal of time ... because I have to explain to
them why Medicare may not pay for their visit to me. You're
legally obliged to explain to the patient that this is considered
medically unnecessary. Well, that choice of words implies to most
patients that you're giving poor medical care. You're making them
come back too often. And I think it's terrible.
12 See Robert H. Brook & Kathleen N. Lohr, Will We Need To Ration Effective
Health Care?, IssuEs Sci. & TECH., Fall 1986, at 68, 72.
13 See Marcia Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician, 254 JAMA 1203, 1204
(1985).
14 See Todd Interview, supra note 7, at 23.
15 The rules to which we refer emanate from the Health Care Financing
Administration. Although the precise content of these rules, as developed and
enforced by HCFA's financial intermediaries, is confidential, a general description
may be found in HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICAL CARRIERS MANUAL § 7500ff.
(HCFA Pub. 14) (1990).
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It wastes 20 minutes of my time explaining to them that no, its
not really medically unnecessary, that that's just how Medicare has
chosen to word the new form .... 16
Making "expensive" synonymous with "medically unnecessary"
seems a particularly troubling example of bureaucratically sanc-
tioned linguistic drift. But it is not just linguistic territory that has
been invaded by the waste cutters. Utilization review companies
have moved beyond the realm of previewing surgical procedures
and into the field of making allocational choices in the cases of very
sick and dying patients. They employ "case managers" to direct the
costly care of their sickest enrollees. This strategy can pay off
handsomely. "[M]any cost-management companies are strengthen-
ing their 'case management' of patients who are seriously ill, with
advanced cancer or AIDS, for example, or recovering from a stroke.
'The savings can average $10,000 to $15,000 per case and be as high
as $400,000., " 17 While some case managers may be truly well-
intentioned, intervening to help patients and save them from
painful overtreatment, they also represent economic interests that
will inevitably conflict at times with the interests of the patient. In
the future, we are likely to hear more from case managers about
"inappropriate," "ineffective," and "medically unnecessary" care.
When we do, it will be hard to know exactly what this means. Is the
proposed treatment harmful or worthless? Is it futile or just too
costly?
These ambiguities must be faced in formulating a sensible
strategy for controlling the cost of medical care in America. It
would be enormously agreeable if cost containment could be
achieved by cutting out a homogeneous wedge of present practices
(Figure 1). But our analysis suggests that waste is heterogeneous
(Figure 2), a claim worth exploring at some length. We need to
know more about the four different types of waste. How prevalent
are they? How do we determine that particular treatments fall into
one of the four categories? What political, social, and professional
obstacles will arise when standards are introduced forbidding
wasteful practices? Will waste-cutting erect barriers to beneficial
care, or can waste-cutting bypass such choices in medical care
16 Are Guidelines, Standards or Parameters Having an Impact on the Way You Practice
Medicine, and How?, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 6, 1989, at 34, 34 (interviewing a private
practitioner in St. Louis).
17 Glenn Kramon, Taking a Scalpel to Health Costs, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1989, § 3,
at 1, 9 (quoting the vice-president of a cost management company).
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allocation? These four questions are at the core of the following
section. Our main findings are summarized in Table I.
II. A TAXONOMY OF "WASTE"
A. Ineffective (or Harmful) Treatment
Some Americans, expert and lay, believe that much of medical
care is ineffective or positively harmful. In part a generalized
rebellion against authority of the 1960s, and nurtured by the
consumer health movement of the 1970s, this view found a
passionate voice in Ivan Illich's 1976 book, Medical Nemesis.I8 His
scathing critique of the medical profession's "poisons" 19 and
"black magic"20 never found widespread public acceptance. But
the 1980s brought a wider condemnation of the medical profession.
Today's conventional wisdom is that doctors have little idea of what
they are doing.
Consider what doctors, to say nothing of patients, don't know
about the value of just one procedure. Every year about 80,000
Americans get a carotid endarterectomy, a kind of Roto-Rooterjob
on clogged neck arteries. Typically costing $9,000, counting the
bill for a hospital stay, the operation is designed to prevent
strokes. Another triumph of modern medicine? Or an overly
risky, overdone alternative to cheaper drug therapy? Incredibly,
no one knows for sure, and no one is tracking the patients on a
systematic basis to find out.
The same holds true for scores of other medical ministrations.
Food companies know the impact of a redesigned ketchup bottle
on sales. But the virtuosos performing hysterectomies, installing
pacemakers and bypassing diseased coronary arteries have only
patchy information about the real payoffs. "Half of what the
medical profession does is of unverified effectiveness," asserts Dr.
Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. of Minneapolis, [one] in a phalanx of
physicians who want to cut down on the guesswork.
21
Academic medicine is trying to answer this criticism. Research-
ers in a relatively new branch of investigation, clinical epidemiology,
are trying to sort out which medical maneuvers are effective.
18 IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS (1976).
19 Id. at 44.
20 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted).
21 Edmund Faltermeyer, Medical Care's Next Revolution, FORTUNE, Oct. 10, 1988,
at 126, 126.
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Ideally, the research involves systematic and painstaking testing of
therapies through randomized controlled clinical trials. But these
experiments, the "gold standard" for determining clinical effective-
ness, are events of epic proportion, lasting for years, costing
millions of dollars, involving thousands of patients, facing monu-
mental bureaucratic barriers, and raising serious ethical issues.
22
Often, by the time clinical trials are completed, the technology they
studied is outmoded.23 Although other methodologies have been
developed and can yield useful information, 24 physicians must
regularly weigh the preponderance of imperfect evidence in order
to estimate whether a particular patient might benefit from a
particular intervention.2 5 It is often possible to entertain some
reasonable doubt (or to hold out some reasonable hope) that a
treatment will be effective. While there is currently a great deal of
enthusiasm about improving the scientific basis of medicine, and
while there is surely room for improvement, a vast project to make
medicine scientific can never keep up with innovations in medical
practice. Nor is it likely to provide firm ground for determining
correct choices in most clinical situations. Medical decision-making
is simply too complex.
26
Given these limitations, how can ineffective treatments be
identified? One approach is to augment imperfect information with
the judgments of experts. Distinguished physicians, well-versed in
the scientific literature, can use their clinical judgment-their beliefs
about what works, based on their own past practices-to produce
22 See Arnold M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement-Will It Get Us Where We Want to
Go?, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 266, 268 (1990); David M. Eddy & John Billings, The
Quality of Medical Evidence: Implicationsfor Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988,
at 19, 28-29.
23 See Eddy & Billings, supra note 22, at 28.
24 These other methodologies, often subsumed under the rubric of "observational
epidemiology," are clearly elucidated inJ. MARK ELLWOOD, CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
IN MEDICINE: A PRACTICAL SYsTEM OF CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1988). For a non-
technical account of the pitfalls of such studies, see MAX MICHAEL ET AL., BIOMEDICAL
BESTIARY: AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC GUIDE TO FLAWS AND FALLACIES IN THE MEDICAL
LITERATURE (1984).
25 See Epstein, supra note 22, at 268; Eddy & Billings, supra note 22, at 20. We do
not wish to create the impression that little of value is known about effectiveness in
clinical medicine. As one of our readers, Dr. Colin Dayan, has pointed out, there are
numerous cases in which researchers have conclusively demonstrated the effectiveness
(or lack thereof) of particular interventions. These cases notwithstanding, no one
doubts that much remains to be learned about the utility of present practices.
26 See Robert W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Assessing Clinical Decision Making:
Is The Ideal System Feasible?, 25 INQUIRY 59, 63 (1988); Eddy & Billings, supra note 22,
at 24.
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estimates of effectiveness. And groups of physicians can combine
their expert judgments to arrive at consensus. A group of research-
ers at the RAND Corporation has developed a method for generat-
ing this kind of professional consensus about what works (and what
doesn't work) in medicine.2 7 Because their innovative method has
been so widely acclaimed and so often held up as a model for
cutting waste by making rules, it warrants a brief review.
The RAND group's goal was to develop practice parameters for
several widely used operations. They assembled a panel of
distinguished physicians for each of the operations, and each panel
member reviewed the available scientific literature about the
procedure.28 With a list of all of the possible clinical scenarios in
which each procedure might be performed, each panelist made an
assessment of the appropriateness of the intervention for each of
the scenarios, based on the literature review and clinical judgment.
After making independent assessments, the panel members met to
discuss the cases and compare their ratings. They found there was
substantial disagreement among them about the appropriateness of
performing the operations in many clinical settings. 29 And so,
after reviewing the cases together, the individual physicians rated
each scenario again, and the revised ratings were combined into a
group consensus rating of the appropriateness of treatment in each
situation. For each clinical scenario, the surgery was rated as
"appropriate," "inappropriate," or "equivocal." "Inappropriate" care
was treatment in which "the expected health benefit[s] (i.e.,
increased life expectancy, relief of pain, reduction in anxiety, [and]
improved functional capacity) [were] exceeded [by] the expected
negative consequences (i.e., mortality, morbidity, anxiety of
anticipating the procedure, pain produced by the procedure, and
time lost from work)."30 Roughly speaking, then, "inappropriate"
was defined to mean ineffective or harmful.
The ratings have been used successfully in pilot programs to
identify "inappropriate" care. Two prominent RAND researchers
recently left the Santa Monica think tank to found Value Health
Sciences, Inc., bringing along the RAND methodology. They then
27 For a discussion of the specific methods used to develop the appropriateness
ratings, see Rolla E. Park et al., Physician Ratings of Appropriate Indications for Six
Medical and Surgical Procedures, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 766 (1986).
28 See id. at 767.
29 See id. at 768-69.
30 Id. at 767.
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developed some innovative software that uses the expert consensus
on appropriateness to deliver second opinions about physician's
treatment choices. Value's clients employ utilization review nurses
to quiz physicians about referrals for the selected procedures.
Using Value's computer-driven questionnaire while talking over the
telephone, the nurses gather information about prospective patients
and then match each prospective patient to a previously rated
clinical scenario. If the prior consensus suggested the operation was
"appropriate" for that patient, the patient's insurance company pays
for the hospital admission. If the rules identified the operation as
"inappropriate," the procedure is not covered. The referring
physician may then appeal the decision regarding coverage with a
doctor representing the utilization review company. In a trial run
by the Aetna insurance company, 15% of 1,000 referrals for
procedures were judged "inappropropriate"; physician appeals
brought the number of actual refusals down to 9%.31
The successful implementation of the RAND/Value method is
one of the first achievements of what has been called the "outcomes
movement."32  This informal coalition of academic researchers,
government officials, physician professional organizations, and
members of the health insurance industry has come together over
the past three years in an effort to study what works in medicine, to
define "appropriate" care, and to use that definition of appropriate-
ness to eliminate allegedly wasteful care through the use of practice
guidelines. While each participant has a slightly different sense of
the movement's mission, 3 most share Paul Ellwood's ambitious
vision:
Outcomes management is a technology of patient experience
designed to help patients, payers, and providers make rational
medical care-related choices based on better insight into the effect
of these choices on the patient's life. Outcomes management
consists of a... language of health outcomes; a national data base
31 See Harris Meyer, Payers To Use Protocols To Assess Treatment Plans, AM. MED.
NEWS, Dec. 9, 1988, at 1, 62-63. Actual refusal rates have increased, as early versions
of the software have been replaced by more sophisticated programs. See telephone
Interview with Dr. Robert DeBois, Senior Vice President of Value Health Sciences
(Mar. 2, 1992); infra note 78 and accompanying text.
32 See Epstein, supra note 22, at 266.
33 These differences in perception have taken several forms. Some participants
have emphasized the movement's potential to cut costs, see Brook & Lohr, supra note
12, at 68; Califano, supra note 6, at A25; Faltermeyer, supra note 21, at 126; others
have highlighted its promise of harnessing scientific knowledge to enhance the quality
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containing information and analysis on clinical, financial and
health outcomes that estimates as best we can the relation between
medical interventions and health outcomes, as well as the relation
between health outcomes and money; and an opportunity for each
decision-maker to have access to the analyses that are relevant to
the choices they must make.
3 4
Federal officials have been enthusiastic supporters of what has
been hailed-perhaps somewhat grandiosely-as "the third revolution
in health care."3 5 Former Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA") director William L. Roper, under pressure to contain
Medicare's explosive growth, announced a major initiative to
"evaluate and improve medical practice" by using HCFA's mammoth
databases to study the outcomes of care given under that pro-
gram.36 In a related later development, the Department of Health
and Human Services' National Center for Health Services Research
of medical care, see AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., RESEARCH ACTIvITIEs 4 (1992) [hereinafter AHCPR,
RESEARCH]; William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to
Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1197, 1197 (1988). Some
members have embraced the idea of using rules to audit physicians' practice choices,
see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. Others, reluctant to promote
"cookbook medicine," and believing that physicians will respond to education about
"appropriate" practices, appear to prefer that adherence to guidelines be kept
voluntary. See AHCPR, RESEARCH, supra, at 5. See also infra note 80. This preference
may be optimistic in light of previous studies showing that physician practice choices
are relatively resistant to the "practice suggestions" of experts. See, e.g.,Jacqueline
Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program
on Physician Practice, 258JAMA 2708, 2712 (1987) (finding that consensus develop-
ment conferences produced little change in patient care); Jonathan Lomas et al., Do
Practice Guidelines Guide Practice? The Effect of Consensus Statements on the Practice of
Physicians, 321 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1306, 1310 (1989) (concluding that while practice
guidelines may affect "the perceptions of physicians," they alone are insufficient to
alter physicians' behavior). Other incentives may be needed to modify practice
patterns. The range of alternatives is canvassed in John M. Eisenberg, Physician
Utilization: The State of Research About Physicians'Practice Patterns, 23 MED. CARE 461,
467-70 (1988).
Despite these differences in perception, it is undeniable that much of the
enthusiasm (and funding) behind the outcomes movement has been driven by the
perception that it will slow the rising cost of medical care expenditures, and it is clear
that many of the key participants view the development of a link between "appropri-
ate" practices and reimbursement as a foregone conclusion. See infra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text. In this essay, we explore the implications of implementing such
a policy.
" Paul M. Ellwood, Shattuck Lecture-Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient
Experience, 318 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1549, 1551 (1988).
35 Arnold S. Relman, Assessment and Accountability: The Third Revolution in Health
Care, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1220, 1220 (1988).
36 See Roper et al., supra note 33, at 1197.
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("NCHSR") was renamed the Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research ("AHCPR") and charged with "promoting the quality,
appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care" and directing
studies that would lead to the development of clinical guidelines for
"treatments or conditions that account for a significant portion of
Medicare expenditures." 7 With the new name came an increase
in federal funding. In 1991, the agency received over sixty million
dollars to investigate the outcomes of medical care and develop
parameters to guide clinical practice.38 Three years earlier, as the
NCHSR, the agency had been given less than two million dollars to
support such efforts.3 9  Many leaders of private industry and
health insurance firms are enthusiastic about these developments,
and foresee using the results to cut costs.
40
The American Medical Association ("AMA") is perhaps the least
likely of the coalition's members. Historically a staunch advocate of
physician autonomy, the AMA has teamed up with the RAND
Corporation and the Academic Medical Center Consortium, a group
of major teaching hospitals,41 to develop practice guidelines for
37 AHCPR, PROGRAM NOTE, supra note 8, at 6 (quoting the Legislative Summary
to the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1989). Although the AHCPR has
been the beneficiary of congressional enthusiasm for medical care cost savings, the
Agency's leaders have recently become eager to avoid disappointment, disclaiming a
connection between guideline development and cost containment. As the Agency
released the first of its guidelines this spring, its director, Dr. J. Jarrett Clinton,
remarked that,
"[t]here are those in Congress who hoped, and still hope, that this effort
would be a cost-savings device, but it has limited use for this purpose....
This is not about cost-cutting, but about getting the best value per dollar
spent in the long run. In some cases, for instance, the guidelines may result
in spending more money on some things.
Warren E. Leary, More Advice for Doctors: U.S. Guides on Treatments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1992, at C14. Despite its position in the forefront of the outcomes movement,
then, the Agency's perception of the movement's direction may be at odds with that
of some of the movement's members and supporters, including some members of
Congress, the insurance industry, the business community, and some academic
researchers.
3 8 See House Subcommittee Votes Level Fundingfor AHCPR and HCFA: Senate Likely
to Increase Support for AHCPR, HSR REPORTS (Association for Health Services
Research, Washington, D.C.),June 1991, at 1, 5.
39 See Epstein, supra note 22, at 266.
40 For example, Blue Cross and Blue Shield executive Bernard T. Tresnowski,
when asked about the practice parameters approach, responded: "'Right On!'" See
Faltermeyer, supra note 21, at 132. "With better data," it is believed, "business could
effectively challenge proposed treatments." Id. at 126.
41 See Report of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association,
Practice Parameters 4 (1990) [hereinafter AMA Trustees' Report] (unpublished
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use by "payers and utilization and medical reviewers to define a
range of practice options physicians could use without incurring
financial or other sanctions . "..."42 The AMA's embrace of the
parameters initiative is somewhat puzzling-few physicians wish to
do their patients harm, but none seem to want to be told what to
do-organized medicine's position probably reflects the recognition
that "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em." As AMA Executive Vice
PresidentJames Todd explained, physicians must lead the effort to
develop practice standards because they "can't afford to abdicate
this responsibility to [the] bureaucratic computer screens of HCFA
or commercial insurance companies." 45 Although support for the
initiative must be viewed primarily as a kind of preemptive strike,
practice parameters do offer some attractive features from the
physicians' perspective. 4 First, they have a substantial educational
potential. In a bewilderingly complex and rapidly changing
technical environment, parameters can provide physicians with
simple, easily accessible reference guide. Second, in a hostile legal
environment, adherence to "appropriate" practices may protect
practitioners from malpractice liability.
45
In summary, parameters do hold some promise in curbing
ineffective or harmful care, and there is clearly energetic activity in
support of their development. But the amount of time and money
required to develop and implement the RAND/Value approach on
a large scale, though unknown, is surely substantial. According to
AHGPR officials, it has taken three years to move from the process
of identifying conditions for guideline development to early pilot
testing of those guidelines; the agency released two guidelines in
March 1992, intending to make several more available this sum-
mer.46 If such guidelines were to be widely used to audit physi-
report, on file with authors).
42 Sharon Mclrath, AMA, Rand Corp. Plan Joint Development of Practice Guidelines,
AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 28, 1988, at 2, 2.
4s Todd Interview, supra note 7, at 25.
44 For an analysis by a physician and leading researcher in the outcomes
movement stressing the advantages of practice parameters, see Robert H. Brook,
Practice Guidelines and PracticingMedicine: Are They Compatible?, 262JAMA 3027,3030
(1989).
45 The relationship between practice guidelines and malpractice liability remains
a point of considerable controversy among commentators. See infra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text.46 See telephone Interview with Robert Isquith, Chief of Public Affairs, AHCPR
(Mar. 3, 1992); telephone Interview with Stephen H. King, M.D., Chief Medical
Officer, AHCPR (July 15, 1991).
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cian choices, the degree of bureaucratization in medical care would
increase substantially. The requirement that physicians "clear" a
large proportion of their decisions could impose significant
additional costs in a system where, experts estimate, as much as 20%
of expenditures already go to administrative matters, 47 and where
provider frustration with the micromanagement of care is already
intense.48 Still, the movement has generated tremendous enthusi-
asm and significant funding. It is worth exploring the probable
consequences of extending its approach to other types of "wasteful"
care.
B. Treatment of Uncertain Effectiveness
Dr. Ellwood's estimate that "half of what the medical profession
does is of unverified effectiveness" 49 is undeniably provocative. If
that were the case, policymakers might well be advised to discontin-
ue such practices pending scientific demonstration of their worth.
Although this could mean waiting decades for research results, the
successful implementation of this policy might cut medical costs
dramatically.
50
There is ample room for doubt about the effectiveness of many
medical treatments. For some treatments, there is very little data on
effectiveness. For most treatments, there is disagreement as to how
to interpret the available data. In the face of this uncertainty, how
47 See Steffie Woolhandler and David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating
Administrative Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1253,
1254-55 (1991).
48 See Gerald W. Grumet, Health Care Rationing Through Inconvenience: The Third
Party's Secret Weapon, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 607, 608 (1988).
49 Faltermeyer, supra note 21 (quoting Dr. Paul M. Ellwood).
'0 This option is discussed in detail in Brook, supra note 44, at 3029. The idea
behind "of uncertain effectiveness" would seem to correspond with the RAND
categorization "equivocal." See Park et al., supra note 27, at 767. Much of the
popular commentary following the release of the RAND results, see supra text
accompanying notes 31-34, conveyed the impression that half of all coronary bypass
surgery had been discovered to be medically unnecessary. See supra note 6. Yet the
RAND group's findings categorized 14% of such surgeries as "inappropriate," while
30% were classed as "equivocal"; it would thus appear that procedures falling under
both of these headings were lumped together in arriving at the "one-half" estimate.
See Constance M. Winslow et al., The Appropriateness of Performing Coronary Artery
Bypass Surgery, 260JAMA 505,509 (1988). We contend that, from the perspective of
health care policymaking, "inappropriate" and "equivocal" procedures are quite
different, and that programs aimed at cutng these two distinct types of "waste"
would for that reason meet quite different fates.
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feasible is it to talk about cutting waste with rules prohibiting
payment for treatments of undetermined effectiveness?
Most physicians would almost certainly oppose this approach.
Because of the lack of scientific knowledge about disease, the
practice of medicine is not a "cookbook" endeavor. Clinicians
extrapolate beyond scientific data in "the large portion of cases...
[that] are clinically gray and require clinical judgment."51 Judging
how to proceed in questionable cases is part of what constitutes the
art of medicine. Physician Donald Berwick of the Harvard Commu-
nity Health Plan has rightly warned that in choosing to cut waste by
overriding clinical judgment, "we [may] gain control of care patterns
only to find that care is being given by doctors who have lost pride
and heart."52  And while the specter of disheartened physicians
might not forestall officials intent upon cutting costs, public opinion
would likely inhibit this approach to "cutting waste." Some patients
would surely be outraged at being denied treatment simply because
scientific data is lacking. The relatively minor turbulence that has
attended the denial of "questionable" drugs to AIDS patients, along
with the success that AIDS advocates have had in modifying and
bypassing bureaucratic obstacles, foreshadows the uproar that would
attend widespread denial of "questionable" care. For example, the
constituency of patients with heart disease is unquestionably
broader and more powerful than those with AIDS; many of the well-
established technologies in this area are of uncertain benefit for
many types of patients. It is implausible to expect that heart-disease
victims would quietly forego potentially lifesaving treatment in the
name of scientific purity. In short, if "wasteful" means "of uncertain
effectiveness," cutting waste by making rules faces substantial
popular and professional opposition.
C. Treatment That Is Ethically Troubling
The explosive growth of the bioethics field, an area that was
virtually nonexistent a generation ago, testifies to the proliferation
of ethically troubling medical treatment.53 The use of aggressive
medical therapies in treating the very old, the very young, and the
very sick has engendered some of the most vehement charges of
51 Meyer, supra note 31, at 63.
52 McIlrath, supra note 42, at 41.
53 A fascinating analysis of these developments can be found in DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS
TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991).
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"waste," "inappropriateness," and "irrationality" in American
medicine.
Rulemaking in this area requires an ethical consensus concern-
ing an appropriate level of care. For people who are intimately
acquainted with instances of gross overtreatment, this often seems
a trivial problem. Waste is apparent and outrageous. Something
like Justice Stewart's standard for obscenity-"I know it when I see
it-seems to hold. But experience shows that even the seemingly
clearest cases can evoke controversy (if not litigation), bringing into
conflict those most intimately familiar with the patient's situation.
These controversies often reflect fundamental disagreements about
the goals and obligations of providers, payers, and patients, or even
disputes about the significance of human life, including a "right to
life." We will not recapitulate the bioethical debates surrounding
these issues.54 It is enough to note that the term "wasteful" is
used here in an entirely different sense than in the previous two
sections. No literature search or scientific experiment satisfactorily
speaks to this issue of "waste." No consensus panel can settle the
ethical question of what is futile, desirable, or even cruel.
What then are the possibilities for policy in this area? What
kinds of rules can be made to cut waste in ethically problematic
cases? Significant progress has been made in defining when it is
permissible to terminate care. Guidelines developed in the bioethics
community have informed court decisions and state statutes.
55
Such policies undoubtedly can help in guiding individual decisions,
but their impact on the overall allocation of medical resources is
unknown. Such guidelines, however, are not analogous to the
RAND/Value procedures to "cut waste." Little progress has been
54 See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING
SOCIETY (1987) (contending that medical care should be rationed based on age);
NORMAN DANIELs, AM I My PARENTs KEEPER? AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN THE
YOUNG AND THE OLD (1988) (examining the competing claims of the young and the
elderly to medical resources); NORMAN DANIELS,JUST HEALTH CARE (1985) (arguing
that a principle of equality of opportunity should guide distribution of health care
services); A.A. Scitovsky and A.M. Capron, Medical Care at the End of Life. The
Interaction of Economics and Ethics, 7 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 59 (1986) (analyzing the
ethical implications of devoting a disproportionate amount of medical resources to
the aged); Anne A. Scitovsky, "The High Cost of Dying': What Do the Data Show?, 62
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 591 (1984) (same).
55 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985) (citing President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems, in MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 23 (1983)
in an analysis of the question of when life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn
from legally incompetent patients).
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made in developing analogous rules in this area, rules that would
say when wastefulness makes it obligatory to deny or terminate care.
(It should be emphasized, moreover, that no one connected with the
landmark RAND studies has proposed that any such rules be made.)
Their very suggestion is enormously controversial, as illustrated
by the reception that greeted Daniel Callahan's proposal that age be
a criterion in the allocation of public funds for medical care.
56
Highlighted on the op-ed pages of the New York Times,57 the
proposal drew vociferous attacks from gerontologists, senior-citizen
advocates, and the elderly themselves. Social critic Nat Hentoff
branded the scheme "morally depraved," a comment that was duly
noted in the American Association of Retired People's News
Bulletin.58 Further discussion was effectively ended. If "wasteful"
means "ethically troubling," cutting wasteful care means facing hard
and bitter choices. In matters of life and death, when values clash,
proposing allocational rules can place those rules beyond reasonable
public discussion. It is difficult to imagine how such a process
could lead to public consensus.
D. Treatment That Is Not Allocationally Efficient
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, bread-and-butter
medicine is not about complex ethical issues. Rather, increasingly
it is about expensive medical care options. Today's physicians must
choose daily from among various costly treatments and tests, many
of which are unquestionably beneficial. Consider these lifesaving
treatments:
(1) Early Cancer Detection (e.g., annual mammography for women
aged 40-50). Since women in this age group have a low incidence
of breast cancer, annual mammography offers a modest improve-
ment in life expectancy at a significant financial and social cost.
Screening 25% of all American women in this age group on an
annual basis would save 373 lives each year. Costs (in 1984 dollars)
would be $408 million for mammography, surgical workups, and
continuing care. Savings from early detection of cancer would be
56 See CALLAHAN, supra note 54.
57 See Daniel Callahan, Rethinking Health Care for the Aged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1987, at A39.
58 See Health Debate Rages Over Rationing By Age, AARP NEws BULL., June 1988,
at I (quoting comments made by Nat Hentoffat a debate sponsored by the National
Council on the Aging).
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$6 million annually, resulting in a net annual cost of $402 million
dollars to save 373 lives.
59
(2) Safer Diagnostic Tests (e.g., nonionic contrast medium).
Contrast medium is a liquid which, when injected into the blood-
stream, circulates throughout the body making blood vessels and
certain organs more visible on x-ray. Injection with the dye carries
a certain risk of a fatal allergic reaction. Recently, a nonionic
contrast dye was introduced that is safer for patients. The risk of
death from injection with the new dye is 1 in 250,000 (an improve-
ment over the risk of 1 in 30,000 with the older dye). The newer
dye costs 10 times as much as the older one, and widespread
adoption could cost as much as one billion dollars annually
nationwide.
60
(3) Organ Transplantation (e.g., heart transplantation). Heart
replacement is surprisingly effective in the treatment of end-stage
heart disease. Recipients enjoy a 75-80% one-year survival rate.
Although only 346 cardiac transplants were performed in 1984, an
estimated 50,000 people could benefit from the procedure each
year. Heart transplantation costs between $70,000 and $200,000 per
patient.
61
When do expensive maneuvers become "wasteful?" Traditional-
ly, policymakers have approached this problem from the framework
of cost-benefit analysis.62 Given a rank ordering of medical
programs and procedures, beginning with the one with the best
cost-to-benefit profile and ending with the one with the least
59 See David M. Eddy et al., The Value of Mammography Screening in Women Under
Age 50 Years, 259JAMA 1512, 1512-19 (1988). For completeness we should note that
the case is more complicated than suggested above. Though the point remains that
mammography is of relatively low benefit to young women, some significant health
costs, such as the risk of a false positive test, are not mentioned. For example, out
of one hundred women undergoing mammography, one will be referred for a breast
biopsy to investigate a radiologic abnormality that turns out not to be cancer. This
raises the question of whether the health and social cost of tens of thousands of
unnecessary surgeries each year outweighs the benefit of a few hundred lives saved.
For an analysis that emphasizes these costs, see John C. Bailar, Mammography Before
Age 50 Years?, 259 JAMA 1548-49 (1988).
60 See Annetta Miller et al., Can You Afford To Get Sick?, NEWsWEEK,Jan. 30, 1989,
at 47.
61 See ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 41 (1988).
62 Cost-benefit analysis is but one form of utilitarian program analysis. Other
methods include cost-utility analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. The application
of these techniques to medical care is thoroughly discussed in MICHAEL F. DRUMMOND
ET AL., METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAMMES 74-
167 (1987). In this section, we refer to cost-benefit analysis, but many of our
comments apply as well to the other related forms of analysis.
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attractive profile, one might simply allocate money from the top
down. Above some cutoff point, the listed interventions could be
considered "worthwhile"; below that point, "wasteful." There are,
however, three significant obstacles to implementing such a plan in
American medicine.
The first is the unavailability of a defensible rank ordering. We
have scant information about the effectiveness and costs of most
clinical interventions. Moreover, we lack a firm conceptual and
empirical basis for equating different kinds of medical, social, and
financial benefits. In the absence of these two sorts of information,
it is difficult to assign meaningful cost-benefit estimates to medical
procedures.6 3 The second difficulty is that the American medical
care system does not operate within a fixed budget (nor do most
American physicians). Without a budgetary limit, the borderline
between "worthwhile" and "wasteful" simply cannot be defined. It
is impossible to say which interventions would fall below a purely
hypothetical cut-off. A final obstacle arises from our decentralized
system of financing. We have no guarantee that cuts in "wasteful"
expenditures will be compensated with shifts toward "worthwhile"
expenditures. We may agree that annual mammographic screening
for young women is comparatively wasteful, but we have no reason
to believe that money saved by abstaining from mammography will
be spent on a more worthwhile endeavor, such as universal access
to prenatal care.
While rigorous cost-benefit analysis is unlikely to govern the
allocation of medical services in the foreseeable future, concerns
about costs and benefits will continue to have an important place in
discussions of "wasteful" care. This is surely appropriate, since no
medical care system can provide all possible services. But when
"not cost effective" is taken to be synonymous with "wasteful," some
misleading inferences can follow. One of these is the suggestion
that treatments that fall below the cost-benefit cutoff point are
"wasteful," and therefore do no one much good. This is certainly
not true. There are many potentially lifesaving treatments that are
63 The theoretical difficulties involved are discussed in some detail in BLANK, supra
note 61, at 115-16. An actual illustration arose in Oregon, where the rigorous
application of cost-benefit techniques led to a rank ordering of therapies in which the
treatment of crooked teeth was placed above therapy for early Hodgkin's disease, and
treatment for thumb-sucking was put above hospitalization of a starving child. See
Fox & Leichter, supra note 4, at 22. Although this original list was subsequently re-
ordered, the initial result exposes the conceptual and empirical weakness ofutilitarian
program analysis, as it applies to medical care.
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very costly, but effective (breast-cancer screening in young women,
safer diagnostic tests, and organ transplantation all fall into this
category). When cutting waste on economic grounds, we inevitably
eliminate some services that do some good. We should therefore
not be surprised to find people fighting for access to treatments
that are "not cost-effective," as did the members of the Komen
Foundation for Breast Cancer in Dallas, a group of wealthy and
socially prominent Republican women who successfully lobbied the
Texas legislature in 1989 to require that insurance companies cover
the cost of screening mammography to all women ages 35 and
over.
64
Such episodes lay bare the link between "waste cutting" and
"rationing." If "waste cutting" means "trimming the fat," and
"rationing" means "making rules to limit the use of beneficial
services," it will necessarily be the case that in trimming fat we deny
some people some beneficial services. What is particularly striking
is that the perception of benefit determines the political cost of waste
cutting. While the medical costs of denying young women access to
screening mammography are quite small (as the analysis cited above
demonstrates), the political price may be prohibitive (as the Texas
legislators found out). Similarly, in the recent Oregon "rationing"
movement, procedures were initially ranked according to their
alleged cost-to-benefit profiles. Organ transplants were near the
bottom in this initial list of services, but the political costs of cutting
this form of "waste" were seen as too great, and organ transplants
were moved upward on the list so that they would qualify for
Medicaid reimbursement. 65 Cutting waste, when waste is either of
great benefit or is perceived to be so, can be prohibitively expensive
politically.
More generally, economically driven rulemaking runs counter to
those American values and institutions favoring aggressive, high-
technology, "do something" medicine. Opinion polls show that
Americans believe, nearly unanimously, that financial considerations
should not enter into life-and-death medical decisions. 66 In the
legal arena, technological imperatives dovetail with our shared
notions of individual rights and professional responsibilities,
6 SeeJane Gross, Turning Disease Into Political Cause: First AIDS, and Now Breast
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1991, at A12.
65 See Fox & Leichter, supra note 4, at 23.
' See RobertJ. Blendon, The Public's View of the Future of Health Care, 259 JAMA
3587, 3590 (1987).
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meaning that rulemaking could exacerbate an increasingly unaccept-
able malpractice environment. As people who are injured by denial
of care seek restitution, several issues will be at stake: Can care be
denied because it is too expensive? When harm results from denial
of treatment, who is responsible? What are the responsibilities of
payers and providers? Already, some interesting cases have been
heard. A Washington state court recently held that a third-party
payer had a duty to pay for a man's liver transplant because his life
depended on it.67 A Michigan woman with colon cancer has sued
her HMO, maintaining that their cost-containment rules led to a
delay in the detection of her malignancy.
68
While commentators agree that the relationship between the
malpractice standard and care cost containment is one of the most
important issues confronting medical tort law in the 1990s, they are
divided on how the legal system will accommodate rulemaking.
Some argue that physicians who prudently adopt recommended
sparer practice styles will find protection in the event of adverse
outcomes.69 Others are doubtful that the accommodation can be
made so smoothly, and fear that economically based rulemaking will
"create enormous confusion and, quite likely, place physicians
under inappropriate and unfair economic and legal pressures"
70
as they are forced to make choices between their own professional
standards and payers' rules.
Whatever the political and legal outcomes, it is clear that
economically driven rulemaking could force physicians to redefine
their professional roles. Many physicians find such rulemaking
unacceptable, 71 and many believe that cost containment measures
seriously compromise the quality of medical care.72 Some hold
67 See BLANK, supra note 61, at 137.
68 See Harris Meyer, Managed Care: HMOs Tighten Their Belts, Look to Hybrid Plans
and Brighter Future, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1989, at 12, 12.
69 See Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision
or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 67, 68; see also Mark A. Hall, The
Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost Containment, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
347, 353 (1984) (arguing that the "law is fully capable ... of recognizing the ...
emergence of cost incentives").
.70 E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 L. MED.
& HEALTH CARE 356, 356 (1989).
71 See Leighton Ku and Dena Fisher, The Attitudes of Physicians Toward Health Care
Cost-Containment Policies, 25 HEALTH SERVICFS RES. 25, 25 (1990).
72 See. e.g., Martin I. Broder, The Impact of Cost Containment on Clinical Care (Mar.
16-17,1987), in THE HEALTH QARE COST CONTAINMENT MOVEMENT: A RECONSIDERA-
TION 9 (Report of a conference sponsored by Medicine in the Public Interest, 1988)
(arguing that cost-containment programs have'had a "disturbing" impact on patient
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that consideration of costs simply has no place in the practice of
medicine. One frequently quoted passage draws a parallel between
the obligations of physicians to their patients and the responsibili-
ties of attorneys to their clients:
[P]hysicians are required to do everything that they believe may
benefit each patient without regard to costs or other societal
considerations. In caring for an individual patient, the doctor
must act solely as that patient's advocate, against the apparent
interests of society as a whole, if necessary. An analogy can be
drawn with the role of a lawyer defending a client against a
criminal charge. The attorney is obligated to use all ethical means
to defend the client, regardless of the cost of prolonged legal
proceedings or even of the possibility that a guilty person may be
acquitted through skillful advocacy. Similarly, in the practice of
medicine, physicians are obligated to do all that they can for their
patients without regard to any costs to society.
73
This attitude, which one might call the "professional impera-
tive," dominates American medical practice, and it will not
disappear overnight.
III. REALISTIC PROSPECTS FOR RULEMAKING
This brief survey of the policy to cut waste by rulemaking has
revealed that it is really many policies-at least as many policies as
there are kinds of waste. Three summary points should be
emphasized. First, there are different senses in which treatments
are "wasteful." We know that some treatments are wasteful by
looking at their results; in other cases we need to examine their
price tag; in still others we must make a moral judgement. While
this is not a profound point, it is one that is frequently obscured in
the rhetoric of waste-cutting. Medicare's rules about medical
necessity (and a myriad of similarly disingenuous policies) create
confusion, breed cynicism, and offer little promise as long-term
strategies to guide the allocation of medical services.
74
care).
7' Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1573
(1984).
74 The extent to which such rules can lead to bitterness, cynicism, and professional
disengagement is well illustrated in a physician's report of his final 18 hospital visits
to an 84-year-old woman dying of lung cancer, visits deemed to be "medically
unnecessary." See Kenneth M. Prager, Medicare Meddling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1988,
at A21.
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Second, since "waste" is diverse, policies to "cut waste" face
different prospects for success. Although some forms of care can
probably be prohibited with little resistance, this is not likely to be
the case generally. There will be substantial professional, political,
ethical, and legal obstacles to cutting waste in many cases. Although
identification of wasteful practices may be conceptually straightfor-
ward, the costs of rulemaking may be high. Rules can work, but
these obstacles must be faced squarely in attempts to develop
coherent and realistic health policy.
Third, because the spectrum of "wasteful" care includes care
that is effective, cutting waste by making rules will not always
circumvent hard choices. Sometimes it may mean eliminating care
that is both needed and beneficial. In other cases, it may mean
cutting services that are perceived to be beneficial but are of
uncertain effectiveness. In either case, we must watch out for
immoderate promises about painless "waste cutting."
While doubts about rulemaking are warranted, nihilism is not.
We all stand to gain from the knowledge that will flow from the
outcomes movement, and rulemaking may work in some situations.
As we have shown, rulemaking is likely to be particularly successful when
the treatment in question is clearly ineffective or harmful. It is, however,
far from obvious that such instances are sufficiently prevalent to
justify the extravagant optimism surrounding the movement's likely
impact. While the oft-cited RAND study of three commonly
performed procedures showed that they were performed "inappro-
priately" in one-third to one-sixth of the cases, 75 this figure in all
likelihood overstates the prevalence of ineffective or harmful care
for three reasons. First, the three procedures were apparently
chosen precisely because the indications for their use are unclear.
Given this uncertainty, it is not surprising that they were often used
"inappropriately." Second, the RAND ratings were based on a
retrospective review of medical records. It is likely that incomplete
documentation produced a number of cases incorrectly rated as
"inappropriate."76 This interpretation is supported by data from
two published cases in which the appropriateness criteria were used
prospectively. In both cases, inappropriateness rates were simply
not as impressive as might have been hoped. In the early Aetna/
75 See Mark R. Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations
in the Use of Health Care Services? A Study of Three Procedures, 258 JAMA 2533, 2535
(1987).
76 See Epstein, supra note 22, at 268.
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Value trial, only 9% of the proposed services were ultimately
deemed not appropriate for reimbursement. 77 In a more recent
trial of the Value software at five Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans,
preauthorization review yielded ajudgment of inappropriateness for
11% of the cases overall.78
Let us assume that 11% of all present medical practices are
demonstrably ineffective or harmful. Eliminating those wasteful
practices would result in substantial savings, given our present level
of expenditure-an attractive prospect indeed. But are savings of
that magnitude likely to be realized in the near future? It seems
likely that implementation would take place over a period of years,
given the AHCPR's past (and admirable) record of crafting
guidelines carefully.79 After developing guidelines, a strategy will
have to be developed to change physician behavior. Whether that
strategy relies on "education'-as the AHCPR would apparently
preferS--or on a RAND/Value-like direct linkage to reimburse-
ment,81 it is clear that it would begin to have its intended effect
only after a period of years.
If this is the case, how can rulemaking affect our level of
medical care spending over the next decade? Providing a precise
answer to this question would require us to address issues of health
77 See Meyer, supra note 31, at 63.
78 See Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Preauthorization Review System Finds
More than 10 Percent of Medical Procedures Inappropriate, 8 MED. BENEFITs 3, 3 (1991).
In this case, inappropriate rates varied substantially by procedure, with 27% of the
proposed tonsillectomies judged to be inappropriate, but none of the proposed heart
bypass surgeries or carotid endarterectomies so rated. See id. The finding of no
inappropriate operations out of the 181 bypass procedures is particularly striking in
view of the voluminous commentary about the magnitude of "waste" in this category.
79 Other organizations are actively engaged in developing guidelines. For
example, many of the medical specialty societies have begun working on parameter
development, and by October 1990 had reportedly constructed some 1,000 different
guidelines. See AMA Trustees' Report, supra note 41, at 2. While this work signals
enthusiasm for the parameters approach, it also raises the question of how to
coordinate the efforts of those involved in the movement to enhance appropriateness
and cut waste.
80 See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, AHCPR PUB. No. 91-0004, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PROGRESS
OF RESEARCH ON OUTCOMES OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 13-14
(1991) (discussing the dissemination of information about new technologies and
ineffective practices). Policymakers at the agency are working to develop methods to
effect change via parameter dissemination, see id., since they are aware of prior
studies showing that the practices of physicians are relatively resistant to the
"suggestions" of experts, see supra note 33.
8f If rulemaking is linked to reimbursement, rules will have to be adopted by
many or all payors to achieve widespread savings.
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economics that are beyond the scope of the present paper. But one
can see that the possible 11% savings-particularly a savings achieved
gradually-would inevitably be dwarfed by the losses exacted by the
present rate of medical care inflation, which one expert has
estimated to occur at a real rate of 7% per annum. 82 Unfortunate-
ly, the plan to cut waste by making rules simply does not address
this cost, one of the central problems of health services allocation.
Eliminating today's waste cannot help us constrain the escalation of
costs attributable to the more effective and more expensive services
to be developed tomorrow. Viewed from this perspective, cutting
waste by making rules is, at best, an incremental reform that might
produce modest gains over the medium term. Despite the claims of
its more ardent supporters, it shows little promise as a solution to
the so-called "health care cost crisis."
In the end, the parameters movement may founder-not because
of a lack of "wasteful" medical care, but because government and
business leaders want a quicker fix to the problem of rising medical
care costs. With wasteful care on the public's mind, a coalition of
resourceful researchers, government officials, politicians, business
leaders, and professional organizations have developed a vision of
a world in which scientific know-how aided by computerized
wizardry will produce rules for allocating the "right" amount of
medical care. But the public's "issue attention cycle" waxes and
wanes quickly.8 3 As it becomes clear that it would be years before
hoped-for economic gains could be realized, and that cuts in "waste"
entail significant social costs, the movement could lose some of its
momentum and funding. As the AHCPR's director recently
remarked to an audience of health-services researchers:
We have a wonderful opportunity to make outcomes and effective-
ness research a very important incremental chapter in the pursuit
82 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 220. It is worth stopping to consider the
magnitude of potential economic gains even under the most generous assumptions.
If we assume that rulemaking and waste-cutting could be implemented for all medical
practices over a one-year period (i.e., with 11% of present costs instantaneously
eliminated), at the end of a decade our health expenditures would total over 175%
of real current expenditures, assuming that the 7% real inflation rate prevails. If we
did not adopt the plan to cut waste, our medical costs at the end of a decade would
be nearly 200% of their real present level, again assuming that inflation continues
unabated. If the program to cut waste were adopted more gradually, the difference
between the economic outcomes under the two scenarios would narrow accordingly.
3 See generally Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-the "Issue Attention
Cycle, "28 PUB. INTEREST 39, 39 (1972) (noting that "American public attention rarely
remains sharply focused upon any one domestic issue for very long").
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of quality and value for the health care dollar. I believe that
window is only going to be open so long. The Congress indeed
expects things tomorrow, and I believe that with reasonable
progress reports from you, I can be a part of telling them that
good work takes time. At the same time, if we say that it takes five
to six years and please hold your breath, then I think we'll lose.
So as I said to the [outcomes research] teams that were assembled
here a few days ago, we're delighted at the progress you're
making, but hurry up.
8 4
IV. Is THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO RULEMAKING?
Nothing above is intended to imply that there is a simple
solution to the problem of rising medical expenditures. The
"professional imperative" that drives physicians to provide more,
better, and safer services (and the desire for better health that
drives patients to seek the same) will continue. If we are to curb
rising costs, powerful countervailing forces must be brought to bear.
Rules can certainly help in applying such forces, and the parameters
movement is well underway. But is rulemaking the most promising
course of action? Any answer must take into account two decades
of frustrating failure to contain health expenditures in America.
During that time, there were numerous attempts to change the way
in which America delivers, pays for, and regulates medical care.
None has been demonstrably successful in curbing medical care
inflation or in constraining the growth in the intensity of services
provided. Neither competition, managed care, prospective
payment, nor numerous other purported panaceas has fulfilled its
promise. Each in its day was touted as the answer to the problem
of rising costs, leading to cycles of delight and disappointment 5
as expenditures resumed their seemingly inexorable rise, or costs
were shifted onto other sectors of the medical care economy. To
expect more of the outcomes movement would be to ignore the
lessons of experience. It is worth sketching what these lessons
might be.
During the same twenty year period that costs rose in this
country, other nations had substantially greater success in control-
84 J.Jarrett Clinton, Address to the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the Association
for Health Services Research (July 1, 1991).
85 See Theodore R. Marmor, American Health Politics 1970 to the Present: Some
Comments, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Winter 1990, at 32, 32-34.
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ling health expenditures. Canada's and Britain's systems are most
often cited, but most of Western Europe's achievements are
comparable.8 6 In each case, the inherently inflationary forces in
medical care that Robert Evans has so eloquently described-
technological growth, asymmetry of information, uncertainty of
evidence, and rising expectations-have been met with policy
responses to counter powerful pressures for more spending. In
Canada, that has meant the concentration of financial authority in
single provincial payors, the use of global hospital budgets, the
separate control of capital expenditures by hospitals, and the active
setting of prices for physician services. In the United States,
reforms failed to address those forces in a concerted fashion, and
inflation has continued unabated.8 7
There are indications that America is moving toward universal
health insurance. Recent public opinion polls show that a majority
of Americans favor a national health insurance system over our
present arrangements.8 8 The appearance in the elite New England
Journal of Medicine of an editorial8 9 and an article9" supporting
some form of universal health insurance signalled that the academic
wing of the medical profession is ready to consider fundamental
changes in the way that medical care is financed. An entire recent
issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association extolled the
virtues of universal access, 91 suggesting that others will not be far
behind. Congress appears prepared to consider such a program
seriously for the first time in twenty years.
92
86 See AJ. Culyer, Cost Containment in Europe, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION: THE
SEARCH FOR EFFICIENCY 29, 30 (1990).
87 An excellent technical account of these issues can be found in ROBERT G.
EvANs, STRAINED MERCY: THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN HEALTH CARE (1984). For
a more general introduction to the same material, see Theodore R. Marmor &Jerry
Mashaw, Northern Light: Canada's LesonsforAerican Health Care, AM. PROSPECT, Fall
1990, at 18.
88 See Robin Toner, Bad News for Bush as Poll Shows National Gloom, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1992, at Al.
89 See Arnold S. Relman, Universal Health Insurance: Its Time Has Come, 320 NEw
ENG.J. MED. 117 (1989).
90 See David U. Himmelstein et al., A National Health Program for the United States,
320 NEw ENG.J. MED. 102 (1989).
91 See Special Issue, Caring for the Uninsured and Underinsured, 265 JAMA 2491
(1991).
92 See Theodore R. Marmor, U.S. Medical-Care System: Why Not the Worst?, WALL
ST. J., June 20, 1991, at A15; Theodore R. Marmor et al., Political Handcuffs Hobble
Debate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at B7.
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Still, most of these powerful parties are unconvinced that reform
should include the kind of concentrated financial and regulatory
power that has repeatedly proved successful abroad. In the context
of the federal budget deficit and the public's hostility toward
increased taxes, it is uncertain whether reform will follow the model
of direct governmental financing. Some claim that a system that
preserves the present employment-based insurance scheme and
maintains some role for private insurance companies is politically
more feasible.93 If such a program could be coupled with strong
governmental regulatory powers, some observers believe that we
might achieve universal access to medical care, while still containing
costs.
9 4
As the debate on major reforms heightens over the coming
months, one truth will continue to be undeniable: contemporary
medicine offers an astonishing array of beneficial therapies. These
therapies will be sought by many patients wanting to improve their
lives. They will be employed by doctors wanting to help their
patients, exercise their craft, and earn their income. There is little
hope that either of the intimate partners in the doctor-patient
relationship will come to see most medical treatment as "wasteful."
Meanwhile, the "professional imperative" will prevail unless
powerfully constrained. While many physicians will refrain from
performing procedures known to be ineffective, most will not be
willing to unilaterally cut other "wasteful" activities (practices of
uncertain effectiveness, activities that are ethically problematic, and
therapies that are not allocationally efficient). If doctors will not say
'no' to their patients, then we can expect that payers will begin to
say 'no' to doctors. And indeed they have begun to do so. A new
coalition has promised to cut health expenditures by making rules
forbidding wasteful treatment. But it is doubtful that "cutting
waste" is as straightforward or as painless as the most voluble
members of the coalition have suggested. And it is certain that
cutting waste by making rules will mean different things to different
people.
93 see HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE 130-31 (1991).
94 See id. at 124-28; Marmor & Mashaw, supra note 87, at 18-29; Ronald Pollack
& Phyllis Torda, The Pragmatic Road Toward National Health Insurance, AM. PROSPECT,
Summer 1991, at 92, 95; Paul Starr, The Middle Class and National Health Reform, AM.
PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 7, 11-12. But seeJoe White, Why Congress Should Push a
National Health Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1991, at C3 (arguing that a Canadian-
style plan is more efficient and politically feasible).
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FIGURE I
A PLAN FOR MEDICAL CARE COST CONTAINMENT
PRESENT MEDICAL
PRACTICES
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